This paper studies the Swedish fiscal consolidation episode of the 1990s through the lens of a small open economy model with distortionary taxation and unemployment. We argue that the simultaneous reduction in the fiscal deficit and unemployment rate in this episode stems from two factors: (i) high growth rates of total factor productivity (TFP), experienced after the implementation of structural reforms; and (ii) a sustained wage restraint that occurred during the 1990s. The model simulations show that economic growth, accounted for mostly by TFP gains, improved the fiscal balance by 8 percentage points of GDP through an expansion of the tax base and fiscal revenues. Moreover, the combination of stable wages and higher TFP boosted net exports and led to a reduction in the unemployment rate. A counterfactual simulation assuming stagnant TFP shows that fiscal consolidation measures alone would have generated a double-digit unemployment rate without eliminating the fiscal deficit. JEL Classification Numbers: E62; J64; H22.
Contents Page

Introduction
Fiscal consolidation programs have been recently implemented in several advanced economies with the objective of reducing …scal de…cits and achieving a sustainable path of public debt. While there are tangible bene…ts of preserving the sustainability of public …nances, …scal consolidation programs have negative short-run e¤ects on economic activity and employment. 1 Moreover, critics of consolidation plans argue that these can be self-defeating as a …scal tightening may reduce output and worsen the overall …scal position. In this context, a key policy question is how to implement a …scal consolidation that ensures a reduction in …scal de…cits while at the same time minimizes output and employment losses. To shed light on this question, we analyze the Swedish …scal consolidation episode of the early 1990s, where the government was able to achieve a simultaneous reduction of the …scal de…cit and the unemployment rate.
Between 1990 and 1993 Sweden experienced one of the worst recessions since the Great Depression as a result of a global downturn and a subsequent banking crisis. As shown in Panel A of Figure 1 , GDP declined by 4 percent between 1990 and 1993. In terms of detrended output, the contraction was 10 percent. The impact of the recession on the labor market was striking. The unemployment rate soared, going from 1.7 percent to 9.1 percent. Moreover, the primary …scal balance su¤ered a signi…cant deterioration, reaching a de…cit of 12 percent of GDP. Not only did government consumption as a share of GDP increase but also net taxes (tax revenues minus transfers) deteriorated sharply in response to the cyclical conditions in the economy. 2 In this context, the Swedish government faced a very di¢ cult choice. On the one hand, a …scal consolidation could restore the health on the public …nances at the expense of higher unemployment. On the other hand, delaying the consolidation could prevent short-run negative e¤ects on aggregate demand and employment at the potential cost of a debt overhang. In 1992 the government decided to implement a …scal consolidation program, encompassing tax increases and spending cuts, and structural reforms to boost productivity. The macroeconomic outcomes during the …scal consolidation episode (1992-2000) were extremely positive: the …scal de…cit was turned into a surplus within a few years, the unemployment rate declined dramatically, and the economy experimented robust economic growth. 3 The main goal of the paper is to analyze the key driving factors behind these macroeconomic outcomes during the …scal consolidation episode.
With that objective in mind we develop a small open economy model with distortionary taxation, unemployment, and real wage rigidities. We focus our analysis on three types of shocks that were important during the …scal consolidation episode: (i) government consumption; (ii) tax rates; and (iii) productivity shocks. We calibrate the model to the Swedish economy and conduct a business cycle accounting decomposition (Chari et al., 2007) to quantify the contributions of each shock to the …scal and macroeconomic outcomes during the period 1992-2000. 4 We …nd that the most important factor accounting for the simultaneous reduction in the …scal de…cit and the unemployment rate during the 1990s was the increase in total factor productivity (TFP). The boost in TFP (see …gure 3), which materialized in the aftermath of the implementation of structural reforms, lead to higher output, an expansion of the tax base, and an increase in …scal revenues of 8 percentage points of GDP. Furthermore, the unemployment rate declined by 4 percentage points as a result of a combination of higher productivity and stable real wages induced in part by policies of wage restraint. We also …nd that in the absence of TFP gains, the …scal consolidation e¤orts would have induced a double-digit unemployment rate without eliminating the …scal de…cit.
While the results from our model show that output growth was crucial for the success of the Swedish …scal consolidation, still there is debate about the sources of growth during this episode. Calmfors (2012a Calmfors ( , 2012b points to two key sources of growth during this period: the increase in potential growth as a result of several structural reforms and the exchange rate devaluation of 1992. The small open economy model considered in the paper captures the …rst factor through changes in measured TFP, but abstracts from variations in the real exchange rate. Since the model features only one good, the real exchange rate in the model is constant. While the exchange rate depreciation contributed to the recovery in the early phase of the consolidation, we argue that sustained gains in productivity were crucial for the success of the …scal consolidation in the medium term. 5 This paper is related to the large literature on the macroeconomic e¤ects of …scal policy. Our starting point is a neoclassical growth model with …scal policy as in Ohanian (1997) , McGrattan and Ohanian (2010) , and Uhlig (2010). We depart from the standard neoclassical model by incorporating two features. First, we include frictional unemployment and real wage rigidities as in Shimer (2010 Shimer ( , 2012 , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , Merz (1995) , and Andol¤ato (1996) . Second, we consider a small open economy setting as in Mendoza (1991) . These two features allow us to reproduce the dynamics of unemployment rate and the external balance, two variables that exhibited a sharp improvement during this episode. 4 In order to implement the business cycle accounting methodology we add additional shocks, so the model predictions fully reproduce the macroeconomic data during the sample period 1992-2000. These additional shocks, labeled other demand shocks, play a minor role in explaining business cycle ‡uctuations during the sample period. 5 It is important to note that in 1981 Sweden experienced a real exchange rate depreciation comparable to the one occurred in 1992 (23 percent) with a limited impact on output growth and the trade balance. The limited e¤ect could be attributed to the fact that the depreciation was temporary and occurred in a period characterized by high wage in ‡ation and stagnant productivity growth, factors that prevented a sustained reduction in unit labor costs. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the potential role of productivity gains and wage dynamics in o¤setting the negative e¤ects of a …scal adjustment on output and employment. We validate empirically our model by conducting a business cycle accounting analysis as in Chari et al. (2007) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the main factors shaping the macroeconomic ‡uctuations during the Swedish …scal consolidation episode. Section III lays out the small open economy model. Section IV summarizes the calibration and empirical strategy for analyzing the …scal consolidation episode. Section V discusses the simulation results. Section VI presents several counterfactual experiments. Section VII concludes.
Macroeconomic Conditions in Sweden (1992-2000):
Fiscal Consolidation Measures, Productivity Gains and Wage Restraint
Three factors were of key importance in in ‡uencing the Swedish business cycle during the period 1992-2000. First, discretionary increases in tax rates and a reduction of government spending implemented during the …scal consolidation. Second, large and sustained productivity gains driven, in part, by the implementation of structural reforms. Third, policies of wage restraint, which contained labor costs during the recovery phase of the cycle. Next, we explain in detail each of these factors and their relevance for our analysis.
Fiscal Consolidation Measures
During the period 1991-1993 the centre-right coalition government initiated a …scal consolidation program. Although the initial …scal measures were not successful in reducing the …scal de…cit in the early 1990s, the government implemented a tax reform that broadened the tax base and reduced the marginal tax rates, improving the e¢ ciency of the tax system. During the period 1994-1998, a centre-left coalition government continued with the …scal consolidation e¤orts, achieving great success in the reduction of …scal de…cits in a context of high economic growth. Throughout the second phase of the consolidation, drastic spending and revenue measures were implemented. Central government spending and transfers to sub-central governments were frozen between 1994 and 1997. Moreover, the government introduced several changes to social security transfers by reducing pensions, unemployment, sickness and child and family bene…ts. On the revenue side, social security contributions and income and capital tax rates were increased. According to Borg (2009) , the increase in capital and income tax rates were implemented not only to raise …scal revenues, but also to preserve the distribution of income and to build legitimacy for the …scal consolidation program.
The total discretionary …scal consolidation measures were 11 percent of GDP during the period 1992-1998, half of which was concentrated on 1992-1995. Moreover, about 40 percent of the consolidation came from higher revenues and the rest from lower government spending. 6 According to Henriksson (2012) , the front-loading of the …scal consolidation was a deliberate strategy of government authorities to provide reassurance to …nancial markets about the sustainability of public …nances.
In 1996 the government adopted a new …scal framework that made it possible, going forward, to secure the gains of the discretionary …scal measures. First, a top-down budget process was implemented by setting expenditure ceilings three years in advance. Once the spending ceiling was de…ned, resources were allocated across 27 expenditure areas. Second, a cyclically-adjusted …scal surplus target of 1 percent was adopted in 1997 in order to anchor the new …scal policy regime. Third, a balanced-budget requirement for local governments was implemented in 2000 with the objective of eliminating the spending bias at the sub-central level. 7 Figure 2 shows how the …scal consolidation measures resulted in an increase in the effective average tax rates on consumption, labor, and capital and a reduction in detrended government consumption. 8 The e¤ective consumption tax increased as a result of higher taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and energy, as well as a broadening of the tax base. The increase in the labor tax rate was a result of higher personal income tax and social security contributions. The e¤ective capital tax rate increased in response to higher taxation on dividends, capital gains, and property. Finally detrended real public consumption decreased as a result of discretionary measures as well as the adoption of the new …scal framework which ensured that government spending increased at a rate below GDP growth.
Productivity Gains
TFP in Sweden was stagnant before the 1990s (see …gure 3). The average annual growth in TFP was only 1.2 percent per year from 1960 to 1990. In 1991, a government-appointed commission focused on improving productivity (Produktivitetsdelegationen) indicated that the lack of competition was one of the main factors behind the low productivity growth in the preceding decades. 9 During the 1990s Sweden experienced a substantial increase in the productivity growth. Between 1993 and 2000, TFP growth was 2.6 percent per year. The increase in productivity was highly persistent, suggesting that structural factors played an important role in accounting for the trajectory of TFP. In this section, we discuss some of the policies that contributed to this structural shift in TFP growth.
In the early 1990s most sectors in the Swedish economy were insulated from competi- 6 See Devries et al. (2011) for a detailed description of the consolidation measures during this episode. 7 For a discussion on the impact of the …scal framework on the improvements in public …nances see Floden (2013). 8 The e¤ective tax rates were calculated following the methodology described in Mendoza et al. (1994) . See Appendix B for more details on the estimation of these tax rates. 9 See Berg (2012).
tion. In fact, cartels and competition-restraining arrangements were commonplace in Sweden provided that they do not introduce large distortions in the economy. By 1992 there were 1250 active cartel agreements which were publicly registered in the Swedish National Price and Cartel Board (SPK). The lack of competition was so pervasive in the Swedish economy that about 80 percent of consumption goods were a¤ected by restrictions on competition, resulting in prices that were substantially higher than the OECD average. 10 Restrictions to competition, in particular in the retail sector, also originated from building and planning regulations included in the "Planning and Building Act."Municipalities restricted the issuance of building permits to big retailers, and imposed a ceiling on the maximum ‡oor space in shops in order to protect small retailers.
Several structural reforms were implemented aimed at enhancing competition and improving the functioning of markets. In 1991 the government submitted the formal application to the European Union membership, which was approved in a referendum in 1994. With the new membership, the government complied with more market-oriented EU regulation and removed trade barriers. As a result of an increase in external competition, Swedish …rms had the incentives to become more e¢ cient.
In 1993 a new "Competition Act" was introduced, and the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) was reformed in order to enforce the new law. The new act prohibited the abuse of dominant positions, and agreements that restrained competition and prevented industry concentration. Moreover, several network industries were deregulated including rail transport, taxi services, air tra¢ c, postal services, telecommunications, and electricity generation and distribution. Many state-owned companies were privatized in steel production, telecommunications, banking, and forestry sectors. In addition, new laws were introduced at the local level to strengthen competition and enhance the e¢ ciency of the public sector. Municipalities were allowed to outsource the provision of public services to the private sector such as health care and schooling, and new planning regulations were enacted to encourage competition at the retail sector by granting licenses to new entrants.
The McKinsey Global Institute (2006) analyzed the impact of deregulation and trade liberalization on productivity growth in …ve sectors of the Swedish economy: automotive, retail banking, retail, processed food, and construction. In 1995 productivity in the Swedish automotive sector was 21 percent lower than in the US, while in the retail, retail banking, processed foods sectors, and construction were, 16, 20, 42, and 23 percent lower, respectively. After the implementation of structural reforms, the improvement in e¢ ciency was dramatic. During the period 1990-2003, productivity in the retail and retail banking sectors increased by 4.6 percent per year, while in the processed food sector productivity increased by 3.1 percent per year. In these three industries the productivity gains were higher than in the US. The most substantial improvement in productivity was in the automotive sector, where the productivity gains were 8 percent per year during the same period. By 2003 the automotive sector productivity level was comparable to the one in Japan, and 5 percent higher than in the US. On the contrary, sectors that were insulated from deregulation and trade liberalization experienced sluggish productivity growth. The construction sector, exposed to limited competition, experienced an average productivity gain of 0.7 percent per year, and by 2003 its labor productivity was 15 percent below the one existing in the US. 11 To what extent the productivity gains were driven by the implementation of structural reforms? Several authors have estimated the e¤ects of structural reforms on growth and productivity. Bouis and Duval (2011) estimate that structural reforms (including reforms to the product and labor markets) increase GDP by 10% in the average OECD economy over a horizon of 10 years. Anderson et al. (2013) simulate the implementation of structural reforms and …nd that euro area countries can increase their GDP between 3 and 11 percent over 10 years. Finally, Barkbu et al. (2012) estimate that half of the labor productivity gains experienced in Sweden during the 1990s were attributed to structural reforms. 12 Figure 3 shows that during the period of structural reforms TFP in Sweden increased by 20 percent, while productivity in the EU increased only by 10 percent. In section V of the paper we quantify the macroeconomic impact of the observed improvements in TFP during the …scal consolidation episode.
Wage Restraint
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During the 1980s the Swedish labor market was characterized by high unionization rates, exceeding 80 percent of the workforce. Moreover, the collective bargaining process with the unions was highly centralized. The Swedish Employers Confederation (SAF) and the three labor organizations (LP, TCO, and SACO) representing the blue-collar, white-collar, and professional workers unions, respectively, participated in the process of collective bargaining.
the manufacturing export sector. In response to these developments, six unions from LP, TCO, and SACO proposed a new institutional arrangement for labor relations, called the Industrial Agreement (IA). 15 The IA was implemented in 1997 and de…ned new rules in the process of wage bargaining. An industry committee, integrated by leaders from unions and employer organizations, was created to facilitate the wage bargaining rounds. The Committee appointed economists, supported by both parties, as members of the Economic Council (EC). The EC was in charge of informing both parties about the state of the economy at the beginning of the wage bargaining process. The Industry Committee enforced a new rule in which new wage agreements should be reached before the expiration of current wage contracts. Moreover, mediators ("impartial chairs") were appointed by the Committee to assist the negotiation process. The mediators had the faculty to propose new arrangements in situations where the negotiation stalled. If a strike was declared, they had the right to order a delay in the negotiations for up to 14 days. The goal of these changes in industrial relations was to minimize disruptions in the production process, and to build consensus in the wage setting process. As a result wage in ‡ation was reduced to an average of 3 percent during the period 1997-2000. Figure 3 illustrates the extent of wage restraint during the consolidation episode. The periods in which real wages were stabilized coincided with the implementation of the wage restraint agreement by the Förhandlingsgruppen (1991-1993) and the adoption of the Industrial Agreement (1997). Moreover, the wage restraint, occurred during a period of raising labor productivity, lead to a decline in unit labor costs. We argue that the combination of wage restraint and productivity gains were key factors that contributed to the observed boost in net exports and the reduction in the unemployment rate during the 1990s.
The Small Open Economy Model
In this section we lay out the model used to analyze the Swedish …scal consolidation episode. The core of the model is a one sector neoclassical growth model with distortionary taxation. We extend this model by considering a small open economy setting, search frictions, and real wage rigidities in order to analyze the dynamics of the unemployment rate and the trade balance. Goods are produced with a constant returns to scale technology that requires capital and labor. The goods market is competitive with ‡exible prices, whereas the labor market exhibits search frictions and real wage rigidities. The government …nances its spending with distortionary taxation and issuing debt. We decentralize the economy and the labor market transactions following Shimer (2010 Shimer ( , 2012 
Matching and Labor Flows
Labor markets exhibit search frictions modeled as in Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) , Pissarides (1985) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , and Shimer (2010) . At the beginning of each period, household's members are either working (n t ) or unemployed searching for a job (u t ). Firms allocate workers in production ((1 v t )n t ) and recruitment activities (v t n t ), where v t is the share of workers assigned to recruitment. We assume a constant participation rate u t + n t = 1. New employment relationships, or matches, are created according to a constant returns to scale matching function m t :
were ! determines the search e¢ ciency and l is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the mass of recruiters. New matches become active next period and a fraction 1 of current workers are dismissed by the …rm such that employment next period is determined by,
From the matching function we can specify the probability of …nding a match for an unemployed worker ( t ) and the probably of recruiters …nding workers q( t ):
where t = (v t n t )=u t is the labor market tightness ratio.
Households
The economy is populated by a mass of in…nitely long-lived individuals with identical preferences. Following Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) , we assume all individuals live in a representative household that maximizes the sum of its members' utility function. The household's utility function is given by uf (c t ; n t ; g t ), where c t , n t , and g t are the household's consumption, the mass of households'members having a job, and government consumption, respectively. Each period households'consume and save into three di¤erent assets: capital, domestic and foreign bonds. The household budget constraint is given by
(1 + where b t is the one-period government debt, b t is the external debt, R t is the risk-free interest rate, and t is the endogenous risk premium on external debt. n t , k t , and c t denote the labor income, capital income and consumption tax rates. The market value of the physical capital depreciation, p k;t k t , represents a tax credit on capital income. tr t denotes government lumpsum transfers. The capital stock, owned by the representative household, evolves according to the following law of motion:
where ( ) is the capital adjustment cost. In equilibrium, the market price of one unit of additional capital stock, p k;t , satis…es:
As in Shimer (2010 Shimer ( , 2012 , households'take as given the path of employment de…ned by the law of motion:
The households'dynamic optimization problem is represented in a recursive form:
subject to (6), (3), and (4).Where S t = fk t ; b t ; b t ; n t g is the list of state variables of the decision problem in period t, H(S t ) is the expected present discounted value of the households'utility, E t [ ] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information in the period t, and 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.
Firms
Output (y t ) is produced with a constant return to scale technology that combines capital and labor:
where a t is the time-varying productivity shock, k t the stock of physical capital, ((1 v t )n t ) is the mass of workers involved in the production process, and t is a labor augmenting productivity trend that grows at the rate t = t 1 = 1 + g . The productivity shock follows an auto-regressive process:
log(a t = a) = a log(a t 1 = a) + " a;t
The mass of workers in the …rm evolves according to the law of motion:
The representative …rm decides the mass of workers n t , the fraction of recruiters v t , and the stock of capital k t that maximizes the expected present value of pro…ts. The …rm's optimization problem is de…ned in a recursive form:
subject to (8) and (10) . Where F (n t ) is the expected present value of pro…ts of the …rm and t;t+1 = uf c;t+1 (1 + c t )=(uf c;t (1 + c t+1 )) is the stochastic discount factor.
Wages
In the presence of search frictions the matching of an unemployed worker with recruiters generates a surplus. We follow the literature and assume that under ‡exible wages the surplus is divided between the …rm and workers following a Nash bargaining process. The bargaining power of the workers is de…ned by the parameter and the equilibrium wage under the assumption of Nash bargaining is determined by the equilibrium condition: 16 F n;t uf c;t 1
where H n;t and F n;t are the marginal bene…ts for households and …rms of having one additional member working at the …rm. We will denote w t the target wage rate that prevails when this equilibrium condition is satis…ed. In our simulation we follow Shimer (2010), and assume that real wages are rigid and the e¤ective wage rate w t evolves according to the following equation:
where w controls the degree of real wage rigidity.
Government
The primary balance of the government is de…ned as:
where government consumption, labor, capital and consumption taxes follow the autoregressive processes: log(g t =( t g)) = g log(g t 1 =( t g)) + " g;t (15)
The government transfers are de…ned as follows:
We include % G > 0 above in order to guarantee that the government debt is stationary along the balance growth path. The government budget constraint is given by:
Closing the Model
The balance of payments identity states that the current account should be equal to the change in foreign bonds:
Where nx t = y t (c t + g t + inv t ) are the net exports. We follow Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé and set t 1 = 
Calibration
We calibrate the model to an annual frequency. We set the growth rate of the labor augmenting technology factor at 2 percent ( g = 1:02). Consistent with an annual real interest of 4 percent, we set = 0:98.
18
The average monthly job-…nding rate is set to 0.148 consistent with the evidence from Perez and Yao (2012). The steady state unemployment rate in set to 5.5 percent, and the corresponding monthly separation rate is 0.0086. Based on this data, we calculate the monthly transition probability matrix for employment and unemployment as: The annual transition probability matrix can be computed as P a = (P m ) 12 . Thus, on annual basis we obtain ( ) = P a (1; 2) = 0:8226 and = 1 P a (2; 1) = 1 0:0479. For the matching function we choose l = 0:5, which corresponds to the midpoint of the range of values typically used in the literature. We set the e¢ ciency parameter in the matching function to ! = 9:75 and the share of recruiters to v = 0:004 consistent with Shimer (2010) . Given the calibration of the matching function, we obtain in the steady state = 0:0071, ( ) = 0:8226, and q( ) = 115 . 18 Notice that = (1 + g )=(1 + r).
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function:
with a = 1 and p = 0:30. We calibrate the depreciation rate to = 0:04 which is consistent with an investment to GDP ratio of 18.5 percent. To determine the equilibrium ‡exible wages, we follow the literature and impose = 1 l, which states that the bargaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the mass of unemployed workers. Regarding the wage rigidity, we calibrate w = 0:95 as in Gorodnichenko et al. (2012) , to capture the degree of wage rigidity in Nordic countries. The capital adjustment costs are modeled as
Using an elasticity of price of capital relative to investment-capital ratio of 0.15 we obtain 2 = 0:15=( + g ) = 2:58. The elasticity of the external debt premium is set to % = 0:001. In steady state, we assume a value for the ratio of net exports to GDP of 1 percent (nx=y = 0:01).
Households'preferences are represented by the following functional form:
we calibrate L = = 1 and the presence of g t in the utility function introduces a complementarity between private and public consumption. 19 The leisure preference parameter is set to N = 0:1421 to be consistent with the equilibrium conditions in the model.
The productivity a t series are calculated using data on GDP, total employment and capital from Haver Analytics. The tax rates time series are constructed with data from Haver Analytics, AMECO and OECD following the methodology in Mendoza et al. (1994) . 20 Government consumption series g t are obtained from Haver Analytics. Based on these series we set the steady state, consumption, labor, and capital taxes to 21, 50 and 33 percent. The steady state government consumption to GDP ratio is set to 29 percent. AR(1) coe¢ cient for the government, consumption, taxes, and productivity are estimated with OLS regressions: a = 0:75, g = 0:80, c = 0:82, n = 0:77 k = 0:62. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters of the model. 19 The baseline calibration = 1 generates a …scal spending multiplier of 0.5. This …scal multiplier is consistent with the estimates for a small open economy like Sweden. See IMF Fiscal Monitor (2012). 20 The methodology is explained in Appendix B. 
Accounting for the Fiscal Consolidation Episode
In this section we conduct a business cycle accounting decomposition (Chari et al., 2007) with the small open economy model and analyze the most important factors driving the macroeconomic outcomes during the …scal consolidation episode. We rely on a set of observable shocks c t , n t , k t , g t , and a t . We also rely on additional shocks to avoid the problem of stochastic singularity. 21 Those additional shocks are grouped into a single category labeled other demand shocks and include exogenous variables such as interest rate, preference and investment shocks. As it will be shown in the simulations, other demand shocks play a minor role in explaining the Swedish business cycle during the sample period. We focus our analysis on four macroeconomic variables: the unemployment rate, the primary …scal balance, the trade balance, and GDP. We also group all shocks into four factors: tax shocks, government consumption shocks, TFP shocks, and other demand shocks. By construction, the simulation of all shocks considered in the model reproduces the dynamics of all observable macroeconomic variables. Figure 4 shows the contribution of each factor in explaining the four macroeconomic variables considered in the simulation. To better understand the contribution of each factor, we analyzed them sequentially: …rst, we consider a baseline simulation where only other demand shocks are operating; second, we add the government consumption shocks; third, we add the tax shocks; …nally, we add TFP shocks. In the last simulation, since all shocks are considered, the model predictions …t perfectly the data. 22 When only the rest of factor shocks are operating (red line), the simulation indicates that the Swedish economy would have remained depressed without being able to consolidate its …scal accounts. The unemployment rate would have exceeded 10 percent during most of the 1990s. Detrended GDP would have declined by 10 percent in 1996 and it would have remained depressed until the year 2000. Moreover, the primary …scal de…cit would have remained in the range between 9 and 15 percent of GDP. The trade balance would have deteriorated reaching a de…cit of 5 percent of GDP by the year 2000.
When we add government consumption shocks (green line), we observe a slight improvement in the …scal and trade balances during the initial years of the consolidation. However, by the end of the period, both variables remain the same as if only the other demand shocks were operating. These dynamics can be explained by the fact that the contraction in government consumption was front-loaded, and most of the negative shocks occurred in the …rst half of the sample. Government consumption shocks had a signi…cant impact on the unemployment rate and detrended GDP. The unemployment rate would have remained above 10 percent while detrended GDP would have declined 6 percent at the end of the sample period. The simulation suggests that government consumption played a limited role in consolidating 21 To avoid the problem of stochastic singularity the number of shocks should be greater or equal to the number of observable variables. The implementation of the business cycle accounting decomposition is explained in appendix A. 22 The business cycle accounting methodology is akin to a historical decomposition of time series models, where the model predictions …t perfectly the data when all shocks are taken into account. the public …nances. Most of the improvement in the primary …scal balance occurred in the early 1990s, but by the end of the sample period the net impact on the primary balance was close to zero.
If we additionally consider the e¤ects of tax shocks (blue line), we observe an increase in primary …scal balance. At the end of the sample period, the …scal de…cit would have reached 4 percent of GDP instead of the 9 percent obtained in the previous simulation. The trade balance would have experimented a modest improvement as a result of a decline in domestic demand (consumption and investment) relative to output. By the year 2000 the trade balance would have reached a de…cit of 4 percent. Both the unemployment rate and GDP would have responded dramatically to the e¤ects of tax shocks. The unemployment rate would have reached 19 percent, while detrended GDP would have declined by 15 percent in the year 2000.
Two comments are in order. First, this simulation (blue line) shows the implications of a …scal consolidation in the absence of TFP gains. In such macroeconomic environment, the …scal consolidation measures would have lead to an increase in the unemployment rate without eliminating the …scal de…cits. Second, even though the average tax rate increased by 10 percentage points (average increase of consumption, capital, and labor tax rates), the primary …scal balance would have improved by only 5 percentage points of GDP. The increase in revenue from higher tax rates is partially o¤set by a decline in the tax base (lower consumption, employment and investment) which highlights the trade-o¤ of closing the …scal de…cit with only tax measures.
The combined e¤ect of all shocks (black line), including TFP, …ts perfectly the data in the accounting exercise. The contribution of TFP can be measured by the di¤erence between the blue and black line in …gure 4. As a result of the improvement in TFP occurred in the 1990s detrended GDP increased by 6 percent. Furthermore, the expansion in the tax base as a result of higher productivity resulted in a primary …scal balance of 5 percent of GDP by the year 2000. At the same time, the combination of stable real wages and productivity gains enabled the Swedish economy to regain competitiveness and to boost net exports and employment. By the end of the sample, the trade balance increased to 6 percent of GDP and the unemployment rate declined to 6 percent. Table 2 summarizes the results of the business cycle accounting decomposition and shows the percentage change of the unemployment rate, GDP, primary …scal balance and trade balance as percent of GDP during the simulation sample period. The …rst column shows the percentage change of all four variables observed in the data and the last four columns shows the contributions of the shocks to each observable variable. By construction the sum of the contributions in each row is equal to the observed data. The simulations show that TFP shocks played a preponderant role in explaining the business cycle and the path of the primary …scal balance during the …scal consolidation episode. Notice that among the …scal consolidation measures adopted by the government, the increase in tax rates rather than the reduction in government consumption played a crucial role in the improvement of the primary …scal balance.
One of the lessons from analyzing the Swedish episode is that the implementation of a …scal consolidation in isolation can depress economic activity and cause a sharp increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover, the business cycle accounting exercise illustrates that drastic …scal consolidation measures generate a limited improvement in the primary …scal balance as a result of a countervailing decline in the tax base.
On the contrary, improvements in TFP in an environment of stable wages can o¤set the negative e¤ects of a …scal consolidation, making it feasible a simultaneous reduction in the …scal de…cit and the unemployment rate. The policy implication derived from the Swedish episode is that …scal consolidations should be implemented in a macroeconomic environment of high TFP growth in order to achieve desirable macroeconomic outcomes. To the extent that structural reforms have a sizable impact on TFP gains, governments should adopt these reforms in conjunction with a …scal consolidation. 24 In the next section we analyze the business cycle implications of the …scal consolidation under alternative scenarios. 
Counterfactual Scenarios
In this section we conduct counterfactual simulations of the …scal consolidation episode under four alternative scenarios: (i) low …scal multiplier; (ii) higher wage ‡exibility; (iii) reduction in risk premium; and (iv) deterioration in the terms of trade. Next we show the simulations for each of these scenarios and discuss in more detail their implications for our analysis.
25 24 Calmfors (2012a) mentions that high output growth derived from structural reforms was necessary for the successful implementation of the …scal consolidation in Sweden. 25 In each of the simulations presented in this section we take as given the shocks estimated in the baseline business cycle accounting exercise and add one additional feature to each scenario.
Low Fiscal Multiplier
In this scenario we assume = 0, which generates a …scal spending multiplier close to zero. Under this assumption government consumption absorbs resources from the economy but it does not provide any bene…ts in terms of higher utility or production as is standard in the neoclassical growth model. In the small open economy setting this assumption generates a …scal multiplier close to zero since households can insure against …scal shocks by borrowing or saving in the rest of the world with limited e¤ects on output. Figure 5 shows that with a low …scal multiplier the …scal consolidation would have generated more benign macroeconomic outcomes. The unemployment rate would have reached 2 percent, GDP would have been 3 percent higher than in the baseline model and the …scal and trade balances would have improved by 1 percent of GDP. Notice that in spite of the gains in output and employment the improvement in the …scal balance is relatively modest. This experiment illustrates that the size of the spending …scal multiplier matters for the output and unemployment dynamics, but has a limited e¤ect on the path of the primary …scal balance. 26 
Higher wage ‡exibility
In this scenario we assume that wages are more ‡exible than in the baseline scenario and calibrate the wage rigidity parameter ( w = 0:85) consistent with the empirical evidence before the …scal consolidation episode . 27 This scenario illustrates the implications of the …scal consolidation in the absence of the wage restraint observed during the 1990s. As a result of assuming higher wage ‡exibility, in equilibrium there is an increase in the unemployment rate during the episode. This outcome is the combination of two driving forces. First, under higher wage ‡exibility and positive productivity shocks the adjustment in the labor market is tilted toward prices rather than quantities. This implies that the initial response from higher productivity will result in higher wages and a smaller increase in labor demand relative to the baseline simulation. Second, the combination of taxes and government consumption shocks depresses the labor supply. Under higher wage ‡exibility the e¤ects of the …scal shocks more than o¤sets the modest employment gains induced by higher productivity, resulting in a net increase in the unemployment rate. Figure 6 shows the outcomes of the …scal consolidation under the assumption of higher wage ‡exibility. In the absence of wage restraint the unemployment rate would have reached 26 We also conducted a robustness check by simulating the model with = 2:4 which is consistent with a …scal multiplier of 1. In that experiment the …scal consolidation has a larger negative impact on GDP and the unemployment rate, but a limited e¤ect on the …scal balance. 27 The inertia parameter w = 0:85 is consistent with an elasticity of real wages to total factor productivity of 0.3. This elasticity was estimated for the period 1960-1990, before the …scal consolidation and the implementation of wage restraint policies. We use the following speci…cation w t = w t 1 + tf p t + " t , where w t and tf p t denote the logarithm of real wages and TFP and is the elasticity of real wages to TFP. The data was obtained from the AMECO database published by the European Commission. For the sample we obtain the following coe¢ cients w t = 0:84w t 1 + 0:34tf p t with R 2 = 0:99. double digits. By the year 2000 the unemployment rate would have reached 16 percent rather than the 6 percent observed in the data. At the end of the sample period GDP would have declined by 2 percent, and the …scal balance would have reached 1 percent of GDP. Notice that the trade balance would have reached only 2 percent of GDP, as a result of high unit labor costs in a scenario where wages grow faster relative to productivity.
Reduction in Risk Premium
In this scenario we study the implications of assuming an endogenous risk premium that depends on the stock of public debt as in Corsetti et al. (2013) . The goal is to evaluate the quantitative e¤ects of the …scal consolidation in a situation where a reduction in public debt stimulates aggregate demand through a decline in interest rates. 28 In particular we assume:
where % bg = 0:002. Under this speci…cation, a reduction in public debt lowers the e¤ective interest rate boosting consumption, investment and GDP. Figure 7 summarizes the results from the simulation. By the year 2000 the decline in the risk premium would have increased GDP by 2 percentage points. The …scal balance would have reached 6 percent of GDP, while the trade balance would have been 2 percent of GDP. While the reduction in the endogenous risk premium would have facilitated the …scal consolidation as a consequence of an expansion in the tax base and tax revenue, at the same time it would have prevented an improvement in the trade balance. The lower interest rate would have resulted in higher domestic demand, an import boom, and a decline in the trade balance relative to the baseline scenario. This simulation shows the challenges of improving simultaneously the …scal and the trade balance in response to a decline in the risk premium associated to lower public debt.
Deterioration in Terms of Trade
In this experiment we evaluate the model dynamics when there is a deterioration in the terms of trade occurring during the …scal consolidation episode. 29 The goal of simulating this scenario is to analyze the implications of an adverse external environment in the implementation of a …scal adjustment. We assume that the terms of trade p t follow an AR(1) process:
We simulate a deterioration in the terms of trade similar to the one experienced by the Swedish economy during the Global Financial Crisis (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . At the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis terms of trade declined by 2 percent on impact and the e¤ect gradually dissipated after 3 years. This path is consistent with p = 0:5. In the model we simulate the decline of terms of trade for the period 1994-1997. 30 Figure 8 shows the outcomes under this scenario. In 1994 GDP declines by 3 percentage points relative to the baseline model. The e¤ects of the negative terms of trade shock dissipate by 1997. As a result of a decline in aggregate demand, the unemployment rate reaches 13 percent in 1994 and then gradually converges to the baseline path by 1997. There is also a temporary deterioration in the trade and …scal balances close to 3 percent of GDP. This experiment sheds light on the role of external conditions in the implementation of a …scal consolidation. During the 1990s terms of trade were stable in Sweden which facilitated the adoption of …scal measures. If alternatively there were headwinds coming from the external sector, the …scal adjustment would have been more challenging for the policymakers at the time.
Conclusions
In this paper we studied the Swedish …scal consolidation episode through the lens of a small open economy model with distortionary taxation and unemployment. We analyzed the driving forces of the macroeconomic outcomes during this episode by conducting a business cycle accounting decomposition. We draw two key lessons from this analysis. First, sustained gains in TFP, spurred in part by the implementation of structural reforms, were crucial in order to achieve a reduction in …scal de…cits. Second, stable real wages, driven in part by policies of wage restraint, in combination with positive productivity shocks made possible a sustained increase in net exports and a reduction of the unemployment rate to single digits. In the absence of productivity gains and stable real wages, the …scal adjustment would have generated a double-digit unemployment rate without eliminating the …scal de…cit.
Our model does not evaluate the direct contribution of other factors that could have in ‡uenced the Swedish business cycle during the …scal consolidation period. The model abstracts from the e¤ects of adopting an in ‡ation targeting regime, the banking crisis and its resolution, and ‡uctuations in the exchange rate. If one or more of these factors were crucial in accounting for the business cycle then they would be re ‡ected in other demand shocks included in the model. However, we found that productivity and …scal shocks account for most of the macroeconomic ‡uctuations during the sample period.
There are important avenues for future research. It would be relevant to evaluate the role of government's credibility in shaping macroeconomic outcomes during the …scal con-solidation. In addition, it would be useful to conduct a cross-country analysis and evaluate the contribution of TFP gains and wage dynamics in facilitating …scal consolidations during other episodes. To perform the accounting exercise of the Swedish …scal consolidation episode we …rst loglinearize the equilibrium condition of the model . We then rely on the Kalman Filter algorithm for the implementation of the business cycle account exercise. The variables used for the accounting exercise are: (i) the unemployment rate; (ii) the detrended GDP; (iii) Government consumption-to-GDP ratio; (iv) consumption-to-GDP ratio; (v) investment-to-GDP ratio; (vi) government primary balance-to-GDP ratio; (vii) Consumption tax; (viii) labor income tax; (ix) capital income tax; (x) detrended total factor productivity. From these variables we infer the underlying shocks a¤ecting the economy from 1992 to 2000 by applying the Kalman …lter algorithm.
The equilibrium conditions of the model require …ve additional shocks in order to avoid the problem of stochastic singularity: (i) job destruction rate shock; (ii) government transfer shock; (iii) investment shock; (iv) foreign interest rate shock; and (v) preference shock. These additional shocks are grouped in other demand shocks and allow us to identify the model and to obtain the historical decomposition of the observable variables. The model's equilibrium conditions are the following:
Labor market tightness:
De…nition of unemployment rate:
Evolution of total employment: n t+1 = t n t + ( t ) (1 n t )
Exogenous evolution of the job destruction rate:
log((1 t )=(1 )) = DES log((1 t 1 )=(1 ))+" DES;t ; " DES;t iidN (0;
Evolution of the capital stock:
where i;t is an investment shock that follows an AR(1) process:
log( i;t = i ) = i log( i;t 1 = i ) + " i;t ; " i;t iid N (0;
The Tobin's Q for the investment demand:
E¤ective wage rate:
Balance of payments condition for the economy as a whole:
De…nition of net exports: nx t = y t (c t + g t + inv t )
The balance growth path is characterized by a annual growth rate equal to g , so
Using these series we follow the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) to calculate the e¤ective tax rates. We focus on the tax rates on consumption, labor, and capital. As an auxiliary variable, we calculate the personal income tax. A fraction of the income tax is allocated to the labor tax while the rest is assigned to the capital tax. Based on the data the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) 
